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June 12, 2012
Joanna L. Grossman

Two More Nails in DOMA’s Coffin: Courts Invalidate Federal Law’s Rejection of SameSex Marriage

In the last two weeks, two federal courts have invalidated Section Three of DOMA, which defines marriage for
all federal-law purposes as a union between a man and a woman.
In Commonwealth v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/10-2214/10-2214-2012-05-31.html) , the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit held that the provision runs afoul of the federal constitution’s guarantee of equal protection of
the law. In Windsor v. U.S., a federal district court in New York did the same. In both cases, the court noted the
utter lack of any connection between any legitimate federal interest and a law that singles out same-sex married
couples for special, adverse treatment.
These courts have joined a growing chorus of opinion—expressed, now, by constituents of all three branches of
government—that DOMA has run its course. From which branch will the final nail in DOMA’s coffin come?
The Hastily-Enacted Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 (DOMA)
As I have described in more detail in a previous column (http://verdict.justia.com/2011/07/26/respect-or-defendmarriage-the-senate-considers-a-bill-to-repeal-the-defense-of-marriage-act-of-1996-doma) , DOMA was enacted in
1996 in a misguided, and ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to ward off same-sex marriage in the United States. It
seemed likely at the time that Hawaii might legalize same-sex marriage due to an opinion of the state’s supreme
court, Baehr v. Lewin, holding that a ban on same-sex marriage was a form of sex discrimination that merited the
highest form of judicial scrutiny.
Opponents of same-sex marriage feared that legalization in one state would effectively mean legalization
nationwide, because other states would be forced to give effect to Hawaii’s same-sex marriages under the federal
Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause. The premise underlying this fear was false—the Full Faith and
Credit Clause’s guarantee has never been understood to apply to marriages, and states have always had, and have
at times exercised, the discretion to withhold their recognition of out-of-state marriages of which they strongly
disapproved. Still, Congress was undeterred.
http://verdict.justia.com/2012/06/12/two-more-nails-in-domas-coffin
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After only a single day of hearings, and no findings of fact, Congress passed DOMA by a wide margin—342-67
in the House and 85-14 in the Senate. Then-President Bill Clinton signed DOMA into law.
DOMA does two things. Section Two of the Act purports to give states the right to refuse recognition to samesex marriages that have been celebrated in other states. And, Section Three provides, as noted above, that federal
law will treat only heterosexual unions as marriages for any federal-law purpose.
Unless and until the U.S. Supreme Court rules that all bans on same-sex marriage violate the federal Constitution,
states are free to refuse recognition to same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions. Indeed, the vast majority of
states have adopted statutory provisions and/or constitutional amendments to adopt a categorical rule of nonrecognition. There has thus been no litigation over the validity of Section Two of DOMA, since states could
refuse recognition to other states’ same-sex marriages even without it.
Section Three of DOMA, however, is a different story. Once same-sex marriage became a reality in the U.S. and
neighboring jurisdictions, the U.S. government was forced to contend with the tens of thousands of same-sex
married couples who (rightfully) want full recognition of their unions. But Section Three prevents that from
happening, with complicated and unfair results. The two recent opinions on which I’ll focus in this column
showcase just some of the difficulties of a system in which a marriage is valid at one level of government, but not
another, as well as the irrationality of this provision of DOMA.
The Claims in the Gill and Commonwealth v. DHHS Cases
The First Circuit’s recent ruling in DHHS is actually a consolidated appeal from two separate cases, which
present the same constitutional challenge to Section Three of DOMA.
In the first case, Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, a group of same-sex couples who were legally married
in Massachusetts, sued because they were each denied some marriage-based entitlement by the federal
government. Among the entitlements denied were spousal health benefits for federal employees, retirement and
survivor benefits under the Social Security system, and joint filing status with the IRS. In each instance, the
married couple presented satisfactory proof of their marriage to the federal agency in question—and in each
instance, they were told, nevertheless, that Section Three of DOMA prevents the federal government from giving
effect to the marriage.
The various agencies at issue were no doubt applying Section Three of DOMA exactly as Congress wrote and
intended it. Under DOMA, these same-sex marriages were to be ignored under federal law, even though each of
the applicable federal statutes otherwise defers to state law in determining marital status. (This deference is a
common feature of federal statutes, which routinely rely on state law to supply definitions or substantive content.
This means, in turn, that residents of different states do not necessarily have the same entitlements under federal
law.)
The Social Security laws, for example, grant survivors’ benefits to dependent children when a wage-earning
parent dies if and only if the state in which the wage-earner lived would itself recognize a parent-child
relationship. Thus, to take one unusual example, a child conceived after the death of either parent (through the
use of frozen sperm, eggs, or embryos) may or may not be entitled to federal Social Security benefits as a
surviving child of the deceased parent, depending on the state in which the wage-earner resided. In a very recent
opinion, Astrue v. Capato (http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/566/11-159/) , the Supreme Court affirmed that
benefits in this situation are governed primarily by state inheritance law. (I have written about this opinion here
(http://verdict.justia.com/2012/05/29/the-supreme-court-on-the-social-security-rights-of-posthumously-conceivedchildren) .)

In the second case, Commonwealth v. HHS, Massachusetts sued to protect its right to honor its own marriages
without risking the loss of federal funding. In administering several of its state programs, Massachusetts, like
other states, relies on federal funding. With respect to several of these programs, Massachusetts was put in the
position of having to refuse recognition to its own marriages (specifically, same-sex marriages legally contracted
in Massachusetts) as a condition of continuing to receive that federal funding.
http://verdict.justia.com/2012/06/12/two-more-nails-in-domas-coffin
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For example, Massachusetts maintains two cemeteries that are used for veterans and their families. But because
DOMA says that a “spouse” is only a party to an opposite-sex marriage, a same-sex spouse cannot be buried
there—even if he or she was legally married to the veteran in Massachusetts. In response to an inquiry from
Massachusetts’ veterans’ affairs office, the federal government explained that it would be entitled to “recapture”
millions of dollars in federal funding for the cemeteries if Massachusetts were to allow same-sex spouses of
veterans to be buried there (without the spouses’ having independent eligibility, such as would derive, for
instance, from their being veterans themselves).
Likewise, Massachusetts’ Medicaid program, which provides health care to the poor, is not permitted to consider
same-sex marital status when determining eligibility for Medicaid services. Normally, a married couple is
assessed as a unit, and the spouses’ incomes are combined when Medicaid makes a ruling about eligibility. But
for a same-sex married couple, DOMA forces the state to consider each person as a single individual, even
though that approach sometimes leads to different results than would have followed had the couple been, instead,
an opposite-sex couple. (The results vary in both directions—leading in different cases to either eligibility or
exclusion, depending on the proportion and amount of income earned by each spouse.) Again, when the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts asked the federal government about how to handle these eligibility programs,
the State was told that it did not have the discretion to recognize same-sex marriages when implementing its
Medicaid program.
The Lower Court Opinions in Gill and DHHS
Both of these cases were heard by the same federal district court judge and decided on similar grounds.
In Gill, Judge Tauro ruled for the plaintiffs by holding that DOMA was invalid under equal protection principles
as applied to them. He concluded that the law did not pass even the most deferential form of judicial review: the
rational-basis test. Even if Congress’s stated objectives for the law were legitimate, none were served by this
provision of DOMA, he reasoned. He also invoked the long history of state control over marriage to call the
federal government’s attempted foray into question.
In Commonwealth v. DHHS, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts objected to being forced to distinguish
between opposite-sex and same-sex marriages, when both types of marriage had been legally contracted under
Massachusetts law, in the course of administering various federal programs. Massachusetts challenged the
constitutionality of Section Three of DOMA on two grounds—first, as a violation of U.S. Constitution’s Tenth
Amendment, on the ground that it was usurping powers reserved to the states; and, second, on the ground that it
was a violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Spending Clause, because it placed an unconstitutional condition on the
state’s right to receive and retain federal funds.
Judge Tauro ruled in favor of the Commonwealth on both counts, considering them together as “two sides of the
same coin.” In ruling on the Tenth Amendment claim, the judge relied heavily on marriage-law history, which
reflects all-but exclusive control over marriage by the states. The Tenth Amendment reserves all non-enumerated
powers to the states, and, in Judge Tauro’s view, Section Three violates the Tenth Amendment by usurping this
“core attribute of state sovereignty.” Judge Tauro also ruled that Section Three violates the spending power
because, under the principles articulated in Gill, it induces the states to act in an unconstitutional manner by
denying equal protection to same-sex married couples. (A more complete analysis of Judge Tauro’s rulings is
available here (http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20100719.html) and here
(http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20100720.html) .)
The First Circuit’s Ruling in DHHS
In the recent ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit consolidated Gill and DHHS into a single
appeal, which produced a single ruling. It also consolidated its analysis, rooting its invalidation of Section Three
in one concept: equal protection. (Because DOMA is a federal, rather than a state, enactment, the relevant
principles come from the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which has been interpreted to guarantee equal
protection as well, rather than from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.)
http://verdict.justia.com/2012/06/12/two-more-nails-in-domas-coffin
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In its unanimous ruling, the First Circuit held that Section Three of DOMA is unconstitutional. It did not, as the
two sets of plaintiffs had urged, apply heightened scrutiny because the law involves a sexual-orientation
classification. The Justice Department, the agency normally charged with defending the validity of federal laws,
argued in favor of heightened scrutiny—and against the validity of DOMA.
In February 2011, the Attorney General, Eric Holder, issued a statement that the Justice Department would no
longer defend the constitutionality of Section Three of DOMA in litigation and, in jurisdictions without binding
precedent to the contrary, it would argue for heightened judicial scrutiny to be applied in cases involving Section
Three. (The so-called Holder Memo is available here (http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag222.html) , and my detailed analysis of it is here
(http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/Grossman.DOMA.2012.Final.PDF) .)
The justification for the non-defense of DOMA that was set forth in the Holder Memo was rooted in the
“legislative record underlying DOMA’s passage,” which “contains numerous expressions reflecting moral
disapproval of gays and lesbians and their intimate and family relationships—precisely the kind of stereotypebased thinking and animus the Equal Protection Clause is designed to guard against.”
A bipartisan group of Congressional representatives, BLAG, has intervened in these and other cases to defend
DOMA’s constitutionality. (More recently, in a noteworthy development, President Obama has stated his
personal belief that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry.)
In its recent ruling, the First Circuit refused to apply heightened scrutiny, given that the Supreme Court has not
yet taken that step, even in cases, like Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas, in which it struck down laws that
singled out homosexuals for adverse treatment. The DHHS court saw no indication “that the Supreme Court is
about to adopt this new suspect classification when it conspicuously failed to do so in Romer—a case that could
readily have been disposed by such a demarche.”
Also despite the plaintiffs’ urging, the First Circuit declined to recognize a constitutional right to same-sex
marriage. Here, the court felt inhibited by Baker v. Nelson, a 1972 case in which the Supreme Court was first
asked to invalidate a state ban on same-sex marriage as a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses. The Supreme Court agreed to review the case, but then dismissed it “for want of a substantial federal
question.”
What is the import of such a dismissal? BLAG argued that it is dispositive as against all constitutional
challenges to anti-same-sex-marriage laws. The First Circuit stopped short of that position, but did conclude that
Baker limits “the arguments to ones that do not presume or rest on a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.”
The First Circuit focused on three precedents in which the Supreme Court has applied the lowest form of scrutiny
and yet has invalidated a governmental enactment on equal protection grounds. These cases include U.S.D.A. v.
Moreno, in which the Court invalidated a food-stamp program that excluded households comprised of unrelated
people; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, in which the Court invalidated a local ordinance that resulted
in the denial of a permit for a group home for the mentally-disabled; and Romer v. Evans, in which the Court
struck down a referendum provision of the Colorado constitution that prohibited legislation to protect
homosexuals from discrimination.
In these three cases, the Supreme Court did not rely on suspect classifications, but, instead, applied “both
intensified scrutiny of purported justifications where minorities are subject to discrepant treatment and have
limited the permissible justifications.” And in areas traditionally left to the states, the Supreme Court has
required “that the federal government interest in intervention be shown with special clarity.” According to the
First Circuit, these rulings provide a method of closely analyzing certain types of enactments without resort to
heightened scrutiny. That method, the First Circuit reasoned, examines the “case-specific nature of the discrepant
treatment, the burden imposed, and the infirmities of the justifications offered.”
When subjected to such a review, Section Three fails miserably. As with the groups that were affected in the
three cases cited above, gay couples have been subjected to “historic patterns of disadvantage.” The burdens of
http://verdict.justia.com/2012/06/12/two-more-nails-in-domas-coffin
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Section Three are potentially great, affecting everything from tax status, to Social Security eligibility, to access to
medical care, to immigration. The First Circuit thus concluded that the “extreme deference accorded to ordinary
economic legislation” would not be appropriate in evaluating Section Three.
Rather, the First Circuit reasoned, the court should “scrutinize with care the purported bases for the legislation”
and provide special consideration to the implications for federalism. The federal government does have “an
interest in who counts as married,” particularly for purposes of federal programs, and the fact that it typically
relies on state law for family status determinations does not mean it must always do so as a rule. The First
Circuit did not find an independent violation, as Judge Tauro did in the rulings below, of the Tenth Amendment
or the Spending Clause. It did, however, find that DOMA’s broad intrusion into an area that has been
traditionally controlled by the states supports “a closer examination” of DOMA’s validity under equal protection
principles.
What were Congress’s justifications for enacting DOMA? In its haste, Congress did not bother to include the
usual niceties in a preamble about the purpose of, or need for, the law. A report of the House of Representatives
identifies four interests that the federal government sought to advance through DOMA: (1) the interest in
encouraging responsible procreation and childrearing; (2) the interest in defending and nurturing the institution of
traditional heterosexual marriage; (3) the interest in defending traditional notions of morality; and (4) the interest
in preserving scarce resources.
The First Circuit evaluated each of these purported interests unfavorably. On the problem of scarce resources,
the court noted, first, that recent reports suggest that Section Three may actually cost the federal government
more money than it saves. Some couples under DOMA will pay fewer taxes; some will be eligible for
government subsidies only because other household income is excluded. But even if Section Three offered a net
financial gain for the government, the First Circuit made clear that saving money is not an adequate justification
for harming an historically-disadvantaged group.
Regarding the claimed interest in responsible procreation and of childrearing, the court noted the controversy
about the effects of gay parenting on children (although the weight of the evidence does not find any harm to
children), but concluded that the evidence was irrelevant, given the lack of connection between the federal
government’s recognition of same-sex marriage and any increase or decrease in the likelihood that children
would be raised by two mothers or two fathers. Parentage law is separate, and is controlled by the states. There
is thus, the First Circuit reasoned, a “lack of any demonstrated connection between DOMA’s treatment of samesex couples and its asserted goal of strengthening the bonds and benefits to society of heterosexual marriage.”
As to moral disapproval of homosexuality, Lawrence v. Texas makes it hard to rest on such a ground. Although
moral disapproval has been traditionally understood as “an adequate basis for legislation,” the majority in
Lawrence held that moral disapproval cannot be the sole basis for discriminatory legislation.
Finally, although Congress may have wanted both to “preserve traditional marriage” and exercise “caution”
while taking stock of the brave new world of gay marriage, Section Three does not further these interests, the
First Circuit observed. The federal government does not issue marriage licenses or take them away; Section
Three just downgrades the status of marriages couples that states have seen fit to allow. Nor does DOMA seem
framed as an exercise in caution—it categorically refuses recognition of gay marriages, indefinitely, regardless of
state law, and without a thought as to the bureaucratic nightmare it creates.
The First Circuit thus concluded that the rationales offered for Section Three do not provide adequate support to
allow it to withstand any level of equal protection analysis. It concluded by noting that although many people
believe marriage should be restricted to heterosexuals, and most states have codified that view into law, some
people and some states have taken a broader approach. And the court added that one “virtue of federalism is that
it permits this diversity of governance based on local choice.” But that diversity among the states, it continued,
includes those states that have “chosen to legalize same-sex marriage.” In sum, the First Circuit concluded,
Section Three’s denial of federal benefits (and burdens) to lawfully married same-sex couples “have not been
adequately supported by any permissible federal interest.”
http://verdict.justia.com/2012/06/12/two-more-nails-in-domas-coffin
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The court noted that invalidating a federal statute is an “unwelcome responsibility for federal judges,” and that
the Supreme Court is very likely to review this or a similar case and provide its own take on DOMA’s validity.
(Because of that likelihood, the First Circuit stayed its mandate pending a petition for review.)
In Brief: The Ruling in Windsor v. U.S.
A week after the First Circuit’s ruling was issued, a federal district court in New York issued a very similar
ruling in Windsor v. U.S., invalidating the application of DOMA to an estate tax return. In Windsor, the widow
of a same-sex spouse, who had been married in Canada, sought (and won) a refund of estate taxes that would not
have been owed had the federal government given effect to the couple’s same-sex marriage.
The New York Attorney General, Eric Schneiderman, filed a brief in Windsor arguing that because New York
now allows same- sex couples to marry (a development I analyze here (http://verdict.justia.com/2011/06/27/samesex-marriage-is-legal-in-new-york-the-in-state-and-national-ramifications) ), it has a greater stake in the federal
government’s mandate of non-recognition via DOMA than it previously did. Schneiderman’s brief argued not
only that Section Three violates the Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution, but also that Section
Three violates the Tenth Amendment’s protection for state sovereignty.
In her ruling, Judge Barbara Jones of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York cited
the week-old ruling in Commonwealth v. DHHS and applied a similar type of reasoning. She did not find Baker
v. Nelson dispositive, given the many developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence since Baker and the lack of
identical issues. She also declined to adopt heightened scrutiny for sexual-orientation classifications, but did,
based on precedents like Romer and Lawrence, look for more than the bare assertions of legitimacy that are
typically found sufficient under rational basis review. Upon looking for a connection between Congress’s
asserted rationales and the statute it enacted, Judge Jones ruled that Section Three “does not pass constitutional
muster.” She ordered, without a stay of the judgment, that the Internal Revenue Servicer refund over $350,000 to
the decedent spouse’s estate.
Courts Are Correct to Increasingly Reject DOMA’s Application
Section Three of DOMA is under attack from many angles. The Executive Branch has refused to defend its
validity in court and has, in isolated cases, refused to apply it in administrative proceedings as well.
Congressional Democrats have introduced and pushed the Respect for Marriage Act, which would repeal it
outright. And now, three federal courts have held that it is unconstitutional. (The first such ruling, Golinski v.
OPM, is analyzed here (http://verdict.justia.com/2012/03/06/is-the-defense-of-marriage-act-doma-indefensible) ; the
other two were discussed above.) As same-sex marriage gains traction—it is now legal in eight states and the
District of Columbia, as well as in numerous foreign jurisdictions—the federal government cannot continue to
refuse recognition unless it abandons a bureaucratic infrastructure in which the federal government chooses to
defer to state law on virtually all family-status determinations, including marriage. And the federal government
surely should not maintain a law that arises purely from animus against a politically unpopular group. In sum,
DHHS and Windsor are two more steps in the direction of righting the wrong that is DOMA.
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